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1 Appendix
1.1 Distinguishing “accommodating” vs. “separating”
founder replacements in VentureSource startups
Founders who have been replaced may stay with the company they started
or leave entirely; Hellmann and Puri (2002) refer to this distinction as “ac-
commodating” vs. “separating” replacements. Prior studies have asked
founders directly regarding the nature of their replacement, which is im-
practical among the population of startups tracked by VentureSource. In
some cases we can determine whether a founder had an “accommodating”
replacement, where they remain at the firm with a different title, as opposed
to a “separating” replacement where they are no longer with the firm. The
VentureSource data on startup executives includes a short biographical string
such as “Founder, Widgets Inc.; Engineer, Google”. In some instances, this
biographical information will contain two titles for the same company, so we
can compare the titles and identify whether a replaced founder stayed with
the firm. Similarly, there are instances where VentureSource will include two
observations for an executive of the firm, one for each of their titles. In total,
243 of 1,999 replaced founders in the main sample are “accommodating re-
placements” using these definitions and VentureSource data. This is likely a
lower bound, so we supplement this information on these title changes using
LinkedIn.
1.2 LinkedIn profile collection
We collected LinkedIn profile information for 1,322 of the 1,999 replaced
founders as well as the executives who replaced them. For each individual,
we searched for their public LinkedIn profile – using their name, startup firm
and dates of entry (exit) – and if found, captured all the relevant information
about their background. The profile link was found using Google and a com-
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bination of their full name and startup name. Data collected included work
experience, education, age as proxied by year of graduation and location.
The educational data allows us to create variables such as “PhD”, “MBA”
and “MD” from a text analysis of degrees earned. The founders that lack
a LinkedIn profile either had their resume restricted to registered users of
LinkedIn or simply did not have a LinkedIn profile we could find.
Our objective is to measure the human capital of the founder executives
at the time of firm founding. To do this, we first identify the startup they
founded or joined in their work experience and past employment. All expe-
rience measures presented in the paper are measured before the start date of
this entry in their work history. If the startup is not listed, we consider only
the job positions with a start date before the reported founding year of the
startup in VentureSource.1
1.2.1 Additional replacement types
The LinkedIn data allows us to more reliably distinguish between “ac-
commodating” and “separating” replacements than relying on VentureSource
alone. The LinkedIn data on work experience typically includes a start and
end date for each position. We use this data for the startup entry to deter-
mine whether the individual founder stayed at the firm for at least one year
after the date they were replaced. If the founder either has an end date a year
after the replacement or starts a new job as reported in LinkedIn more than a
year later, then we label the replacement as “accommodating.” This exercise
labeled an additional “accommodating” 314 replacements. When combined
with our original search for such replacements using VentureSource title his-
tories and biographical information, 507 of the 1,322 (38%) replaced founders
for which we have a LinkedIn profile are accommodating. This number is
quite close to the 40% reported by Hellmann and Puri (2002).
1Some profiles had a list of employers without start or end dates. These profiles are
not included in the same because we cannot accurately track human capital at the time
of firm founding.
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1.3 Data collection for “home bias” analysis
Our full dataset includes 1,999 replacements of executives. Our aim is
to establish the prior geographic location of each replacement hire in order
to understand whether the replacement was from the same state as the fo-
cal startup. Such an analysis helps reinforce our assumption that changes
in non-compete laws in a state primarily impact companies in that same
state. VentureSource provides the name and most recent employer for each
executive at each startup but does not contain the location of that prior
employer.
The replacement’s prior location is not always the same as the previous
employer’s state of incorporation or its current location (as the firm may
have moved). Moreover, since the non-compete contracts that form the basis
of our instrumental variable are governed by the state where the worker
performs the job and not the corporate headquarters – especially in the
case of large companies with multiple offices – we need to know where the
replacement hire was working. Finally, many companies have similar names,
have changed names, or have undergone mergers or acquisitions. Given these
complications, we proceed in two stages.
First, we look for direct evidence of where the replacement hire worked.
Often this was available by means of self-report on profile websites such
as LinkedIn. Many executive hirings were announced in articles in business
news publications which provided information about work history. Executive
biographies often indicated that a particular person “managed the Atlanta
office”, etc. In some cases, more specialized research was involved, such as
instances where the assignee address on a patent provided the location of
where the replacement hire performed the work.
Second, when references to a specific individual’s work history was un-
available, we relied on inferring their location through identification of the
prior employer’s address at the time of their affiliation. Frequently we were
able to glean locations from company data on sites such as Capital IQ, Zoom-
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info, or CrunchBase. In many cases this was straightforward because the
firm had a single location, or because its various locations were contained
within a single state. In cases of large, multi-state firms, we assumed that an
executive-level hire likely came from the corporate headquarters unless that
person’s jobs both before and after were in a different state. For example, if
the prior employer was Microsoft but both the (subsequent) startup and the
job prior to Microsoft were located in Silicon Valley, we assumed that the
person worked for Microsoft in California.
Using this method, we were able to compile (state-level) locations for
1,474 of the 1,999 (73%) replacement hires. (Note that this number is higher
than those for whom we found career histories using LinkedIn profiles. This is
both because we were sometimes able to determine the replacement’s location
from the VenutureSource biography string or other sources, even if LinkedIn
was not available.)
1.4 NETS data description
The analysis of the firms’ annual employment uses a merge of Venture-
Source and the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS). NETS covers
more than 40 million firms founded between 1990 and 2010 and with employ-
ment data available through 2013. NETS is constructed from annual Dun
& Bradstreet reports, so data reliability is believed to be high. We merged
NETS with the firms in our sample using company name, address, founding
date and industry. Not all firms in VentureSource are found in NETS: of
the 11,929 in our sample, we matched 7,146 to NETS. The two variables
often used from NETS are establishment-level annual sales and employment.
Given the average age of firms in our sample is less than four years old, most
are single establishment firms.
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1.5 Search for additional founders
We conducted several data collection exercises to improve coverage of
founders among the company executives reported by VentureSource. The
statistics reported below consider the set of entrepreneurial firms that are
backed by venture capital investors and were founded in our sample period.2
VentureSource has imperfect coverage of startup founders, so we con-
ducted several data collection exercises to improve the identification of founders.
3 We omitted any startup where VentureSource reports no founders; how-
ever, before doing so we took several steps to identify founders not reported
by VentureSource.
First, we searched for founders using online resources.4 These resources
included the company’s website, CapitalIQ, LinkedIn and Zoominfo. For
each of these firms that lacked a founder, a research assistant was given all
the executives listed in VentureSource and asked to flag which ones were
founders according to at least two unique sources outside of VentureSource.5
This search resulted in an additional 2,776 founders at 2,159 firms. Second,
for each executive listed as starting at the firm before the firm’s first VC
financing and who was not listed as a founder, we searched for whether the
individual was a founder. An additional 740 founders we identified this way.
Third, after collecting founders for firms that lacked any, we searched for
additional founders to further improve coverage. Additional founders were
first identified by merging VentureSource entrepreneurial firms to Crunchbase
using website URL. Crunchbase provides a list of founders, which were then
2We also drop firms where a founder left before they raised venture capital, which
happened in fewer than 100 firms.
3Much of these these were in fact completed before the first submission, although we
did not exhaustively describe our methods, which may have suggested that we uncritically
accepted VentureSource as original data.
4We in fact searched for over 4500 such firms, but many were not in our final sample
because of founding year or investor characteristics.
5This rule ensures minimizes the problem of individuals assigning themselves as firm
founders years after the firm is established.
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compared to the executives in VentureSource, resulting in 508 additional
founders. (a reassuringly low 5% of firms that merged).
Fourth, we focused on the set of firms that had solo founding teams after
this data collection and were not already analyzed by an RA. For each of
the firms, an RA searched for whether any non-executive was listed as a
founder of the firm using the sources described above. This resulted in 1,226
additional founders. In the raw VentureSource data, there were 6,219 firms
with just one founder. Following the above data collection exercises, there
were 8,471, an increase of 36%. Each of these data cleaning exercises relied
on VentureSource listing the founder as a manager or executive of the firm.
The final data exercise attempted to determine the quality of this coverage.
A large fraction of startups in VentureSource with at least two founders
were not directly addressed in the data cleaning or collection discussed thus
far. To confirm that these set of firms have their founders flagged, we re-
peated a similar exercise as just described for 200 random firms.6 A research
assistant was given two hundred company names, urls, background and loca-
tion and tasked with finding all the founders of the firm. The set of identified
founders and founding team size was then compared to our coverage of the
same firms. In less than 12% of the instances did a firm have a founder not in
our data while in less than 5% of the cases did VentureSource have a founder
that was not identified as one through this search. Fortunately for our analy-
sis, many of the founders not labeled as such in VentureSource for non-single
founder firms did not have executive titles above VP. This paper’s focus is
on founder executives with such titles, so we conclude that VentureSource’s
coverage of top executives of firms accurately captures the vast majority of
possible founders with executive roles.
Following these four steps of data collection, we identify 5,250 new founders
in 4,631 firms. The impact of team size from this data collection is mean-
6It was prohibitively expensive to confirm all the founders in VentureSource. Our focus
was primarily on finding founders of firms with no reported founders and solo teams.
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ingful. The search for both founders of firms that lacked a founder in Ven-
tureSource or additional founders in the executive team resulted in a team
size increase from 1.6 in the raw VentureSource data to 2.15 in the cleaned
version.
Our average of 2.15 founders per startup compares favorably withh prior
survey-based studies. In their sample of 50 venture-backed companies that
completed an IPO, Kaplan, Sensoy and Stro¨mberg (2009) 1.9 founders on
average. Beckman (2006) augments the dataset used by Hellmann and Puri
(2002) to include data on all founders of the 170 Silicon-Valley-based compa-
nies collected by Burton (1995), finding 2.2 founders on average. Wasserman
(2003) finds an average of 2.5 founders among a combination of 202 venture-
backed and non-venture backed startups. Note moreover that some studies
of founder-CEO replacement, such as Hellmann and Puri (2002) and Chen
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2 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Exit valuation trends for firms financed in strengthened CNC law
states
Notes: Figure reports the log of the average exit valuation for startups financed before the
law changes in the states where the CNC law changes were strengthened.
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Figure 2: Exit valuation trends for firms financed in weakened CNC law
states
Notes: Figure reports the log of the average exit valuation for startups financed before the
law changes in the states where the CNC law changes were weakened.
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Table A1: Top 40 employers of replacing executives joining entrepreneurial
firms
Notes: Table tabulates the count of employers for the executives that join the en-
trepreneurial firms in our sample where we identify a replacement. Employers are from
the short biographical string of the executive available in VentureSource. The table only
reports the top 40 firms where we can (i) identify the past employer in VentureSource and
(ii) identify that firm in VC-backed acquisition activity and SDC. “Total acquisitions”
counts the number of firms acquiring US-based targets from 1992 to 2008.
Count Percent Cumulative % Total acquisitions
IBM 59 6.81 6.81 80
Oracle 57 6.57 13.38 44
HP 43 4.96 18.34 60
Cisco 42 4.84 23.18 86
Lucent 39 4.50 27.68 26
AT&T 38 4.38 32.06 31
Microsoft 36 4.15 36.22 87
GE 30 3.46 39.68 197
Intel 29 3.34 43.02 42
Nortel 28 3.23 46.25 8
Motorola 26 3.00 49.25 47
Sun Microsystems 24 2.77 52.02 39
EMC 23 2.65 54.67 32
PeopleSoft 21 2.42 57.09 15
Symantec 21 2.42 59.52 34
Ernst & Young 20 2.31 61.82 34
Price Waterhouse 19 2.19 64.01 1
SAP 19 2.19 66.21 1
Deloitte & Touche 18 2.08 68.28 33
Siebel 18 2.08 70.36 15
Lucent 17 1.96 72.32 26
Dell 17 1.96 74.28 9
3Com 16 1.85 76.12 18
Siemens 16 1.85 77.97 23
McKesson 15 1.73 79.70 25
Novell 14 1.61 81.31 17
Cadence Design Systems 13 1.50 82.81 29
EDS 13 1.50 84.31 29
Yahoo 13 1.50 85.81 26
Ariba 12 1.38 87.20 26
Medtronic 12 1.38 88.58 32
i2 12 1.38 89.97 9
AOL 11 1.27 91.23 15
Accenture 11 1.27 92.50 0
Apple 11 1.27 93.77 13
Computer Associates 11 1.27 95.04 2
FOX 11 1.27 96.31 5
Pfizer 11 1.27 97.58 19
Sony 11 1.27 98.85 4
Merck & Co 10 1.15 100.00 7
Total 867 100.00
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Table A2: Comparison of replaced founders who stayed vs. left
Note: We retrieved career histories for 1,352 replaced founders from LinkedIn. The table
reports means, differences and two-sided t-statistic p-values for two sub-samples. All
variables are measured at the date (year) of the startup founding. “Years experience
pre-startup” reports the number of years from either undergraduate graduation or first
reported job to the founding year. “Number of jobs on LinkedIn” is the count of the
number of unique jobs prior to joining the startup. “Held CEO position” is one if the
founder held the CEO title in any of these past positions. “Past founder” is one if any
of the past positions has a founder title. “Ph.D”, “MBA,” “Master’s degree,” “M.D.”
and “Bachelor’s degree” are dummy variables for whether the individual had one of these
degrees listed on their profile. “# LinkedIn connections (truncated)” are the number of
connections reported on their profile, truncated at 500 (set to 501 if this is the case).
Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Founder left Founder stayed Diff/s.e.
Years experience pre-startup 16.25 14.52 1.730∗∗∗
0.492
Number jobs on LinkedIn 4.567 4.246 0.321∗∗
0.160
Held CEO position 0.604 0.602 0.00226
0.0293
Past founder 0.586 0.622 -0.0356
0.0294
Held CXO position 0.889 0.881 0.00726
0.0191
Ph.D 0.116 0.185 -0.0690∗∗∗
0.0209
M.D. 0.0279 0.0286 -0.000716
0.00992
MBA 0.274 0.213 0.0612∗∗
0.0259
Master’s degree (including MBA) 0.453 0.380 0.0724∗∗
0.0296
Bachelor’s degree 0.795 0.769 0.0260
0.0246
# LinkedIn connections (truncated) 303.0 293.0 9.968
13.04
Number founders 800 501 1301
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Table A3: Changes in Non-compete enforceability and startup liquidity
events
Notes: Table assesses the correlation between adjustments in non-compete enforcement
policy and liquidity events of startup companies in the same state. Observations are
state-years. “Increased Enforceability” is defined as -1, 0, 1 for states where non-compete
enforceability was loosened, unchanged, or tightened (respectively). “Log # active star-
tups in state, previous year” reports the number of startups active in that state during
the previous calendar year, as a measure of the stock of companies that could potentially
exit. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, clustered at the state. Significance:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Number of state-level
IPOs and acquisitions
All states Treated states
(1) (2)
Increased Enforceability -0.0684 -0.173
(0.157) (0.150)




Model Neg. Bin. Neg. Bin.
Year FE? Y Y
State # FE? Y Y
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Table A4: Employment growth and firm outcomes: Instrumental variables
Notes: Table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for founder replacement and entrepreneurial
firm outcomes. The unit of observation is a entrepreneurial firm where there still remain
active founders on the executive team. The sample of entrepreneurial firms is described
in Section 4. Column (1) regresses a dummy variable for whether a startup has an IPO
or attractive acquisition on a set of controls. The control “Increase employment?” is one
if the firm had positive employment growth in its last pre-law change financing. Em-
ployment growth is measured from the NETS database. “Increased Enforceability” is a
dummy variable representing whether the state in which a focal startup is located changed
its non-compete laws; values of 1, 0, and -1 correspond to an increase in enforceability, no
change, and a decrease in enforceability, respectively. Other controls are as defined in Ta-
ble 1. Column (2) reports the first stage probit estimates where the replacement dummy is
instrumented by the interaction term “Increased Enforceability” given the policy change
(if any) in that startup’s state. “1st. stage F” is the first-stage F-statistic for weak instru-
ments. Column (3) reports the two-stage least squares second stage estimates. Columns
(4) - (5) consider the dependent variable that is the log of the exit valuation (set to 25%
of capital raised if the firm failed, had an unknown exit valuation or was still private by
the end of the sample). “Financing year FE” are fixed effects for the financing year and
“Round # FE” are fixed effects for the financing round number. “Industry FE” are fixed
effects for the seven major industries in VentureSource. “State FE” are fixed effects for
the startup’s headquarter state. “F-stat” is the Cragg-Donald Wald F weak instruments
statistic. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
IPO/Acq.? Emp. Growth IPO/Acq.? Log exit value Log exit value
OLS First stage 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Increase employment? 0.0644∗ -0.421 0.260 -5.196
(0.0348) (0.877) (0.151) (7.249)
Increased Enforceability 0.140
(0.144)
Log capital stock 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0393 0.0361∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗
(0.00916) (0.0461) (0.0154) (0.0582) (0.109)
Syndicate size -0.0180 0.0852 -0.00443 0.0664 0.199
(0.0166) (0.101) (0.0365) (0.0769) (0.270)
Profitable at financing -0.0236 0.109 -0.00485 -0.0442 0.150
(0.0323) (0.134) (0.0503) (0.129) (0.382)
Constant -0.191 -0.628 -0.120 -3.353∗∗∗ -1.454
(0.199) (0.807) (0.410) (0.424) (3.354)
Observations 625 625 625 618 618
R2 0.0187 0.137 . 0.479 .
1st stage F-stat 1.280
Financing year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Founding year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Round # FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE? Y Y Y Y Y
State FE? Y Y Y Y Y
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Table A5: Founder replacement and firm outcomes: Instrumental variables
without state fixed effects
Notes: Table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for founder replacement and entrepreneurial
firm outcomes. The unit of observation is a entrepreneurial firm first financed before a
focal non-compete change. Startups are either headquartered in one of the states with a
non-compete law change or in another state but have received capital from an investor
in a treated startup. The sample of entrepreneurial firms is described in Section 4 of
the main paper. All columns are as described in Table 9 of the main draft. “Financing
year FE” are fixed effects for the financing year prior to the reference law change year
and “Round # FE” are fixed effects for the financing round number. “Industry FE” are
fixed effects for the seven major industries in VentureSource. “Founding year FE” are
fixed effects for the startup’s founding year. “State FE” are fixed effects for the startup’s
headquarter state. Robust standard errors clustered at the entrepreneurial firm reported
in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
IPO/Acq.? Replaced? IPO/Acq.? Log exit value
OLS First stage 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Founder replaced -0.0633∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗
(0.0166) (0.159) (0.0544) (0.812)
Increased Enforceability -0.328∗∗∗
(0.0875)
Log capital stock 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.0127∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗
(0.00616) (0.0135) (0.00727) (0.0145) (0.0409)
Syndicate size 0.0168∗ -0.0159 0.0188∗∗ 0.0627∗ 0.0747∗∗
(0.00947) (0.0299) (0.00813) (0.0335) (0.0362)
Profitable at financing 0.0146 0.0689∗ 0.00943 0.0785∗ 0.0565
(0.00996) (0.0385) (0.0101) (0.0431) (0.0470)
Constant -0.124∗∗∗ -2.794∗∗∗ -0.0709∗∗ -3.018∗∗∗ -2.692∗∗∗
(0.0348) (0.377) (0.0320) (0.234) (0.271)
Observations 8879 8879 8879 8708 8708
R2 0.0492 0.0798 . 0.463 .
1st stage F-stat 14.08
Financing year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Founding year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Round # FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Industry∗Found. year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
State FE? N N N N N
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Table A6: Founder replacement and firm outcomes: Instrumental variables
and VC firm fixed effects
Notes: Table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates for founder replacement and entrepreneurial
firm outcomes. The unit of observation is a entrepreneurial firm - VC investor in the VC’s
portfolio and financed before the focal non-compete change. We include VC investors who
have at least one investment in a treated startup and have at least five total investments
over the sample period. The sample of entrepreneurial firms is described in Section 4 of
the main paper. All columns are as described in Table 9 of the main draft. “Financing
year FE” are fixed effects for the financing year prior to the reference law change year
and “Round # FE” are fixed effects for the financing round number. “Industry FE” are
fixed effects for the seven major industries in VentureSource. “Founding year FE” are
fixed effects for the startup’s founding year. “State FE” are fixed effects for the startup’s
headquarter state. Robust standard errors clustered at the entrepreneurial firm reported
in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
IPO/Acq.? Replaced? IPO/Acq.? Log exit value
OLS First stage 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Founder replaced -0.0808∗∗∗ 0.896∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ 5.624∗∗∗
(0.0148) (0.405) (0.0599) (2.162)
Increased Enforceability -0.0438∗∗∗
(0.0154)
Log capital stock 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗ -0.0231 1.071∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
(0.00485) (0.00429) (0.0214) (0.0200) (0.114)
Syndicate size 0.0115 -0.00733 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0470 0.102∗∗∗
(0.00978) (0.00939) (0.00562) (0.0394) (0.0325)
Profitable at financing 0.0220∗ 0.0152 0.00781 0.131∗∗ 0.0342
(0.0126) (0.0120) (0.00912) (0.0532) (0.0507)
Constant -0.554∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.207 -4.224∗∗∗ -2.078
(0.103) (0.0998) (0.303) (0.422) (1.584)
Observations 41874 41874 41874 41010 41010
Num. VCs 3559 3559 3559 3553 3553
R2 0.0742 0.0554 . 0.428 .
1st stage F-stat 8.130
Financing year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Founding year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Round # FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Industry FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Industry∗Found. year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
VC firm FE? Y Y Y Y Y
State FE? N N N N N
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